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We present new indicators of U.S. technological change for the period 1909-49 based on 
information in the Library of Congress’ catalogue. We use these indicators to estimate the 
connections between technological change and economic activity, and to investigate the 
relationship between fluctuations in innovative activity and the Great Depression. Although we 
do find links between technological change, output and productivity, our results suggest that the 
slowdown in technological progress in the early 1930s did not contribute significantly to the 
Great Depression. On the other hand, the remarkable acceleration in innovations after 1934 did 
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  1I. Introduction 
  Economists today generally agree that advances in total factor productivity (TFP) are a 
principal source of economic growth.  While Abramovitz observed many years ago that TFP 
(a.k.a. the Solow residual) is “a measure of our ignorance”, most would still endorse the notion 
that technological change is a major component.  The irony is that, in spite of this endorsement, 
we still lack compelling ways to measure innovative activity.  In short, all the usual suspects – 
patents, expenditures on and/or numbers engaged in research and development, and enumeration 
of innovations – are, for various reasons, flawed, especially for the years prior to WW II (see, for 
example, Cyert and Mowery (1987)) and we have come up with very little to put in their place.  
  In this paper, we present new indicators of technological change for the period 1909-49 
that, we argue, help to resolve the measurement problem.  Our new measures are created using 
previously unexploited information from the Library of Congress (LOC) catalogue on the 
number of new technology titles (manuals, handbooks, and the like) published in the United 
States during this period.  To illustrate the value of these indicators, we employ them to evaluate 
a number of hypotheses in the literature that deal with the relationship between technical change 
and economic activity in the 1930s.  
  Before we describe our indicators and outline our approach, we review briefly the 
shortcomings associated with previous attempts to quantify technological change.  It is generally 
agreed that patent statistics provide an imprecise measure of innovative activity.  Patent 
applications, the usual metric, offer no guarantee that a commercially viable innovation will be 
forthcoming
1 and, even if it were to occur, knowledge of the filing date provides no information 
on the release date of the product or process.    Furthermore, according to Schmookler (1961), 
patent statistics for the 1930s are especially unreliable because the propensity to patent by 
corporations was adversely affected by the increase in political and judicial antipathy towards 
corporate patents.   
  The other widely accepted measure of innovation is R&D expenditures and/or numbers 
employed in private, non-farm research facilities.  The problem with these data, at least for the 
period prior to WW II, is that figures on R&D employment are limited to a few benchmark dates 
while those on R&D expenditures pertain to one sector of the economy (manufacturing).  
                                                 
1 Schmookler (1961, p. 55) observes, on the basis of patent applications for the period 1901 to 1945, that roughly 
half of patented inventions never result in commercial innovations.  
  2Although useful as broad indicators of trends in innovative effort, the numbers available for this 
period have little value for detailed statistical analysis.  Moreover, R&D data, like patent 
applications, record inputs into the inventive process not the output of commercially viable 
innovations.  It is the latter not the former that matters to those interested in the impact of 
technical change on economic activity.     
The enumeration of important innovations – the method used by Mensch (1979) and 
others to calculate innovative activity - remains the best direct measure of technical change but it 
too has drawbacks.  In particular, both the significance of the product/process and the timing of 
its introduction are highly subjective. The predicament is clear: if we want to evaluate 
quantitatively the link between technical change and economic activity in the pre-WW II period, 
we need a measure that provides consistent, complete, objective, and direct estimates of 
commercially viable innovations.   
Our new indicators of technological change, we believe, satisfy these requirements.  They 
are based on data drawn from the LOC on the number of new technology titles in various fields 
published in the United States during the first fifty years of the last century.
2  Since the LOC is 
the largest in the United States and acts as the country’s copyright depository, these data provide 
an accurate representation of the flow of new technology books available to the trade and to the 
public.  Moreover, publication statistics on new technology books in the early part of the 
twentieth century are likely to offer first rate indicators of technological change for the simple 
reason that there were few alternatives to books as a way to “spread the news”.
3  
Our new measure is superior in a number of respects to the traditional indicators of 
technical change.  First, it is amenable to statistical analysis because the LOC data can be used to 
create a consistent time series on an annual basis for the entire period 1909-49, both for 
technology in general and for various sub-groups of technologies that would have been used in 
                                                 
2 Alexopoulos (2006) creates and analyses similar measures for the period 1955-1997.  We are aware of only one 
other attempt to use publications to measure technological change.  Sullivan (1984) successfully employs books on 
agricultural techniques published between 1523 and 1900 to measure technological change in English farming 
during this period.  (We are grateful to Giovanni Federico for this reference.) 
3 It is probably safe to say that new books on technology provide an even more complete picture of technological 
change during our period than they do for the years covered by Alexopoulos (2006).  This is encouraging because 
Alexopoulos was able to show that these data offer an excellent measure of advances in commercially viable 
innovations.    
  3the private, non-farm economy.  Second, unlike patents and R&D statistics, publications of new 
technology books are timed to coincide with the commercialization of new products or 
processes.  That is, the books appear at the precise moment that the innovations are most likely 
to exert their influence on output and productivity.  Third, these indicators suffer from none of 
the arbitrariness associated with enumeration exercises – timing and numbers are strictly 
determined by their first appearance in the MARC records of the LOC. 
To summarize briefly our results, we find first that our indicators are, for the most part, 
consistent with the case studies reported by Mensch (1981), Field (2003), and others.   
Second, using vector autoregressions (VARs) – a standard statistical technique for such 
analyses
4 - we are able to identify a strong causal connection between technological advances as 
measured by new publications and changes in TFP and GNP per capita for the years 1909-49. 
We find, moreover, that while the impact of technical change on economic activity was 
substantial, our results also indicate that some innovations mattered more than others.  Thus, 
advances in electrical and mechanical machinery, manufacturing, and automobiles had a 
powerful, positive influence on both GNP per capita and measured TFP, new chemical 
technologies pushed up the latter but not the former, while innovations in telecommunications, 
although numerous, had little impact on either variable.  
This brings us to the literature on the 1930s where our new indicators, we believe, help 
shed light on three issues.   First, Field (2003, 2006), has argued on the basis of advances in TFP 
and a variety of microeconomic case studies and sectoral evidence, that the 1930s (1929-41) was 
the most technologically progressive decade of the twentieth century in the United States. 
Moreover, he notes that certain sectors – telecommunications, electric utilities, structural 
engineering, wholesale and retail trades, and so on - were much more innovative than others. 
There are two difficulties with this approach.  His TFP numbers, drawn from Kendrick (1961) 
and Solow (1957), provide, at best, an imprecise estimate of technical change.  As Cyert and 
Mowery (1987, p. 30) point out, since TFP is derived as a residual, it does not provide, in fact, a 
direct measure of technological change.  That is, since other factors aside from new technology 
influence the size of the residual, changes in TFP fail to supply a fool proof estimate of 
innovative activity. Similarly, while case studies may help pinpoint areas of technological 
                                                 
4 See, Sims (1980), Burbidge and Harrison (1985), Francis and Ramey (2004) and Harrison and Weder (2006) for 
some examples that focus on the period of the Great Depression. 
  4change, they tell us very little about the quantitative impact of the different innovations on TFP 
or GNP. Our new indicators resolve both of these problems.  We are able to corroborate Field’s 
contention that the 1930s was a technologically progressive decade – whether it was the most 
progressive of the century remains, for us, an open question since our data stop in 1949.  We also 
find, in keeping with Field, that some areas were more progressive technologically than others.  
However, our results suggest that not all advances were created equal – some had a much greater 
impact on growth and productivity than others.  
The second issue deals with technology shocks and the onset of the depression. Although 
many causes of the Great Depression have been presented in the literature, a number of 
economists, prominent among them Cole and Ohanian (1999), Ohanian (2001), and Francis and 
Ramey (2004), have argued that broadly defined negative productivity shocks (often simply 
referred to as negative technology shocks) contributed to the fall in production after 1929. 
Although compelling, especially to those who embrace the real business cycle paradigm, the 
question remains, what do these broadly defined productivity shocks actually represent? That is, 
since these shocks are identified using either the Solow residual or the Gali (1999) long run 
identification method, and since factors other than technology may be contained in these 
measures, we still need a way to distinguish between changes in pure technology and changes in 
other factors.
5 In an effort to address precisely this problem, Ohanian (2001) attempts to estimate 
how much of the decline in Kendrick’s measured TFP in the early 1930s can be attributed to 
various components of the residual including changes in: capacity utilization, the quality of 
factor inputs, the composition of production, labor-hoarding, and economies of scale. He finds 
that these factors explain less than one third of the eighteen percent decrease, leaving 
unexplained the remaining two thirds. Although he observes that the decrease in TFP is unlikely 
to be attributable to “technological regress” (and we agree), this does not rule out the possibility 
that the decline may be linked to negative pure technology shocks which caused the rate of 
innovative activity to drop below its trend level.
6 With our new indicators, however, we can 
evaluate with some precision the role played by pure technology shocks in the downturn. We 
find that while broadly defined productivity shocks reduced the efficiency with which inputs 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2006) for a discussion of this point. 
6 R. Szostak (1995) argues that the slowdown in innovative activity in the late 1920s was a major contributor to the 
great depression but he lacks evidence to support his contention. 
  5were transformed into outputs and thus fostered the depression, narrowly construed, pure 
technology shocks – as captured by our measure - did not. 
Third, Mensch (1979), Kleinknecht (1987), and others maintain, following Schumpeter, 
that recovery from the depression was directly linked to the burst of innovative activity that 
occurred in the second half of the 1930s.  The problem, once again, is that the evidence, while 
suggestive, fails to establish a causal connection between innovations, output, and productivity.  
Our new measures solve the problem.   Briefly, we find that the acceleration of technical change 
after 1934 did play a significant role in the recovery to the end of the decade.  More generally, on 
the assumption that technological progress remained at rates achieved in the 1920s, our 
calculations suggest that it would have taken an additional 14 years for GNP per capita to have 
matched the actual level reached in 1939 because of slower growth in TFP.   Technological 
change does not offer a complete explanation for the recovery – other forces were clearly at work 
- but it does seem to have made a significant contribution to it.           
We proceed as follows in the remainder of the paper.  In the next section, we first 
describe in more detail our new indicators and the intuition that underlies them and then show 
that they are, for the most part, consistent with the case studies reported by Mensch (1981), Field 
(2003) and others.  Following this, we use Vector Autoregressions (VARs) to establish a causal 
link between technological advances as measured by new publications and changes in TFP and 
GNP per capita during the period 1909-49.  In section four, we use the coefficients and shocks 
generated by our regression to answer three questions: first, were the 1930s technologically 
progressive; second, did pure technology shocks (based on our indicators) contribute to the 
depression: and, third, what would have happened to output and productivity had the rate of 
technological innovation been less vigorous in the 1930s than it was?  In the final section, we 
conclude and offer suggestions for further research. 
   
II. Book Publications as an Indicator of Innovative Activity 
 
Although much of the basic science underlying an innovation is likely to be known, at 
least by others in the field, knowledge of the commercial product or process developed out of the 
science is, almost by definition, unknown until it hits the market.  Thus, successful launch 
necessitates dissemination of information and this is where books enter.  In this section, we 
  6describe our indicators, give the intuition behind them, and then compare them with the 




Following the methodology proposed by Alexopoulos (2006), we have constructed our 
new indicators of technological change from the LOC’s MARC (MAchine Readable Cataloging 
format) records.
7  These files are used by the library to run its online book search program, and 
are available to other libraries to help them catalogue new books.  Since the LOC is the copyright 
depository for the U.S. and by far the country’s largest library with over 130 million items on 
approximately 530 miles of bookshelves, the records provide a virtually complete list of all new 
titles copyrighted within the United States across a vast range of subjects.
 
Each MARC record contains, among other things, information on the type of book (for 
example, a new title or a new edition of an existing one), the country of publication, the language 
of publication, the LOC’s Classification Code, and a list of major subjects treated in the book.  
To create measures of technical change for the private non-farm economy, we use the first three 
categories plus the classification code to identify new titles in different fields of non-military 
technology (found in the subgroups of the T classification listed in Appendix A) published in 
English in the US between 1909 and 1949.  Since we are interested in new technologies used in 
the private economy, we exclude books on handicrafts (under subgroup TT) and all books in the 
subgroup TX (Home Economics) with the exception of books on the hospitality industry.  
Finally, we remove all books that include history as a descriptor (either in the title or in subject 
keywords) for the obvious reason that they are unlikely to have much to do with the new 
innovations. Thus, a recent book that chronicles the early years of Alexander Graham Bell’s 
invention will be excluded since it tells us nothing about the current state of technology in the 
communications industry.  The remaining list of titles includes manuals and books that deal with 
all technology related topics including their nature and function, how they work, and how to use 
and/or repair them. Some are published or sponsored by the innovator/company that developed 
the new technology, others by third parties who hope to profit from book sales.   
                                                 
7 Our measure differs from the one presented in Alexopoulos (2006) in terms of both time period and sub-groups of 
technical change. 
  7An example will help illustrate the type of publications included in our indicators (We 
include additional examples in Appendix B.)  The early part of the twentieth century witnessed a 
number of technological advances in automobile tires including the introduction of the first 
inflatable tire and changes in the materials used to make them. In the LOC’s collection, we find 
repair manuals produced by tire companies such as Goodyear and Firestone, books on tire 
maintenance released by general publishers, and publications by the United States Bureau of 
Standards on government standards and endurance tests and tips on use and care. The motive for 
publishing, in all cases, was the same: to spread the word about the new innovation, for the most 
part, in pursuit of financial gain. 
In Figure 1, we report the results of our efforts.  The graphs represent the number of new 
titles by year drawn from the following fields chosen, with three exceptions, to correspond with 
those identified by Mensch (1979) and Field (2003) as technologically dynamic in the 1930s: 
total technology, chemicals, automobiles, electrical machinery and electronics, mechanical 
machinery/manufacturing, telecommunications.  Since the three exceptions, children’s and 
medical books and titles in fiction, poetry, and music have no obvious connection with 
technological innovation we can use them to answer two questions.  First, is the pattern of new 
titles that we observe among our indicators simply an artifact of the publishing industry and, 
second, to the extent that we find a statistically significant relationship between our indicators 
and output and productivity, is it simply a case of correlation without causation?  We deal with 
the latter question in the next section but address the former here.    
Although the years covered by our study encompass some extraordinary events, including 
two world wars and the Great Depression, there is little evidence to suggest that these events so 
overwhelm our indicators that they reflect nothing more than overall trends in publishing.   With 
regard to the two wars, for example, articles in the New York Times suggest that neither had 
much impact on the publishing industry.  This is the unequivocal message of the article “Books 
and Figures” that appeared on February 3, 1918. Roughly twenty-five years later, on November 
12, 1943, it was reported in “A New Cut in Book Paper” that the War Production Board 
intended, on the recommendation of the book publishing and manufacturing industry advisory 
committee, to restrict the supply of print paper for books to seventy-five percent of the 1942 
level.   It was noted, however, that this was unlikely to affect the supply of reading material 
  8because publishers, to compensate, planned to use thinner paper, narrower margins, and smaller 
type face. 
As for the depression, we can again refer to articles in the New York Times for anecdotal 
evidence.  For example, in “Book Industry Thrives Despite Depression, Finding Strong Trend to 
Serious Reading” (August 31, 1931) and “Hopeful Publishers” (September 1, 1931), it was 
reported that the types of publications that were cut during the Depression were, on the whole, 
marginal ones, the kinds that publishing houses, in better times, were willing to gamble on.  The 
important point is that the titles that compose our indicators were not marginal and were, 
therefore, unaffected by the slump. 
More generally (and somewhat less anecdotally), the graphs in Figure 1 indicate that the 
pattern traced by new technology titles overall and by subgroups differs from that sketched by 
the three exceptions which, it should be noted, do not themselves conform to a single pattern.
8  
Moreover, even among the subgroups, patterns differ.  For example, as can be seen in the graphs, 
while there is virtually no change in the number of new titles in telecommunications between 
1924 and 1940, the number of titles in manufacturing jumps between 1924-30, drops sharply 
during the dark days of the depression, then experiences an equally dramatic upswing between 
1933 and 1943. This is reflected in the low correlation (0.22) between these series’ growth rates. 
New automotive titles, on the other hand, rise during the early 1930s despite the slumping sales 
of automobiles, trucks and moving equipment.  There is also substantial variation in the behavior 
of the subgroups during WWII. For example, while the total number of technology books decline 
after the onset of the war, there are many new titles on manufacturing technologies and 
telecommunication technologies introduced from 1941-1943. Automotive titles do not fall until 
after Roosevelt bans the production of civilian automobiles and trucks in 1942. While at least 
part of the decline in the number of new titles between 1942 and 1945 may be attributable to 
self-imposed restrictions by the publishing industry and quotas placed on paper usage, a large 
part of the decline in our technology indicators reflects a shift in interest towards military 
technologies.  Consequently, for a significant number of technology subgroups including 
automobiles, chemicals, and electrical engineering, many of the new technologies developed for 
                                                 
8 The correlations between the growth rates of the subgroup indicators and the total technology indicator range from 
0.30 to 0.58, and the correlation between the growth rate of the exceptions indicators and the total technology 
indicator range from 0.248 to 0.37.    
  9wartime use, such as advances in explosives, artillery, electronics linked to weapons, and 
telecommunications geared to combat,  appear as titles under the Library of Congress’ U and V 
classifications (that is, under military and naval science).  In short, our indicators represent more 
than simply the ebb and flow of output in the publishing industry.     
The patterns we observe here also support our contention that the indicators are capturing 
changes in innovation rather than simply reflecting changes in demand for technical books.  For 
example, if new technology titles were introduced because of a large demand for them by 
workers looking to retrain during a slump – as opposed to being introduced because of new 
innovations coming to market - then the number of titles should have sharply increased during 
the period 1931-33. As the figures show, this did not happen. 
   
II.B. Intuitive Appeal: 
  
A good indicator of technical change needs to capture innovations at the moment of their 
commercialization.  As Alexopoulos (2006) argues, publications, for sound economic reasons 
should do precisely that.  Innovating companies want to promote their innovations; independent 
writers want to sell books.  For both, timing is critical – too early and the publication is useless, 
too late and it is, at best, dated.
9  Our new measures for the years 1909-49, therefore, overcome 
one of the principal defects associated with indicators based on patent applications and R&D 
expenditures – long and indeterminate lags between conception and commercialization.  
The indicators have an additional attractive feature as measures of technical change - they 
weight the various new technologies differently, an important factor in determining the impact of 
the different innovations on economic activity.  The argument runs as follows.  Since more titles 
are likely to appear on a major (or general purpose) technology than on a minor (or sector 
specific) one, our indicators more closely resemble citation-weighted patent ones, discussed, for 
example, in Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002),  than they do those based on a simple count of annual 
                                                 
9 We are aware that some new titles may appear after the initial release date (e.g., new titles linked to the radio do 
come out after 1922). However, we would argue that, since new titles are costly to produce and market, the majority 
appear because: (1) the product/process has been redesigned (e.g., today’s radio differs significantly than the one 
marketed in 1922) or (2) the existing product/process has been adopted by a different segment of the economy 
(which would represent a new technological advance among this group). 
  10patent applications.  However, in our case, the weight given to each technology annually is 
determined by the number of new titles released on it each year.  This means that our indicators 
are high for one of two reasons:  (1) lots of small innovations are brought to market during the 
course of the year, each accompanied by a couple of new publications, or (2) a major innovation 
debuts that affects many sectors and fosters numerous new titles.  In both cases, we would expect 
to observe a positive correlation between the number of new publications and output and 
productivity.  And, this, of course, is exactly the relationship that we are trying to capture.      
There are, finally, innovative changes in management, factory organization, and power 
sources that traditional measures of technical change may overlook. They are often not amenable 
to the patent process, they may have little to do with the research lab, and they are unlikely to be 
embodied in some major new piece of equipment.  They can, however, show up in publications 
for the simple reason that someone stands to profit from writing about them.
10  Moreover, their 
impact may be considerable.   Thus, as Weintraub (1939, p. 24) points out, in a number of 
manufacturing industries, including cotton-garment production and automobiles, changes in 
factory layout and, more generally, in the organization of production, resulted in substantial 
increases in productivity through improvements in the flow of work and savings in supervisory 
labor, equipment, floor space, and inventories in the 1930s with little, if any, changes in 
equipment.  
Books, of course, are not the only way to disseminate information about new 
technologies.  Even in the pre-WW II period, trade journals, professional and/or scientific 
conferences, and direct marketing, among others, served as sources of information on new 
technologies.  However, it is reasonable to believe that these other methods of communications 
acted as complements to our book based measures of technical change. In any case, to the extent 
that our indicators omit some innovations, the bias runs against (and not in favor of) our finding 
a relationship between publications and increases in economic activity and should, therefore, be 
viewed as establishing a lower bound on the true impact of technological change over this time 
period.   
                                                 
10 There are many books in the LOC T classification that have the terms Factory management or industrial 
efficiency as subject keywords, for example. The list includes titles such as: Future of mechanization in production 
management; Industrial management in this machine age; The control of quality in manufacturing; The principles of 
factory organization and management; and Ford production methods.   
  11 
II.C. Old and New Indicators Compared 
 
While perhaps intuitively appealing, we must still demonstrate that our new measures 
provide an accurate, quantitative account of innovative activity.  In a previous article, 
Alexopoulos (2006) established a strong positive link between new publications of technology 
books – in general and by sub-categories – and innovations for the post-WW II period.  The 
question is whether a similar connection can be shown to exist for the pre-WW II period?  
Although we are prevented by data problems from repeating the statistical analysis carried out by 
Alexopoulos, we can show that our new indicators are, at the very least, consistent with the 
findings of Mensch (1979) on major innovations and Mowery and Rosenberg (2000) on R&D 
expenditures and personnel.       
Mensch (1979, p. 127-8) presents a table, based on case studies of inventors and inventions 
reported in Jewkes, Sawers, and Stillerman (1969), in which he lists major new inventions by 
date of conception and by date of innovation, that is, by the date that the invention either enters 
into production or an “organized market” for it appears.  The numbers, he maintains, confirm his 
view that the 1930s, particularly from 1933 on, was a time of intense innovative activity. (See 
also Field 2006)  Although the years chosen by Mensch (1979) for his innovations are often less 
cut-and-dried than he would like us to believe (see Jewkes, et al (1969) for the details), they do 
offer widely accepted benchmarks with which we can evaluate our indicators.
11   A comparison 
of innovation dates from Mensch (1979) and  commercialization dates from Jewkes, et al (1969) 
with the dates that the same innovations made their first appearance in the LOC database reveals, 
on the whole, a reasonable coincidence of timing between the series (See Appendix B for 
examples). Although we are reluctant to draw too much comfort from these results, they do 
suggest that publications are in general agreement with a standard measure of innovations during 
this time period. 
                                                 
11 Although the dating of major innovations can help to single out periods of intense innovative activity, as we 
mentioned before, both timing and significance are highly subjective.  A good example of this is the radio.  An 
apparently straightforward innovation, the radio was, in fact, the outcome of a series of independent innovations, 
each one of which gave rise to something that resembled the modern radio.  It was, without question, a major 
innovation but it is unclear which of the many steps should be used for dating purposes. 
  12In Figure 2, we compare our publication series with the estimates of scientists employed in 
R&D laboratories, spending on R&D in industry and Mensch’s (1979) series on important 
innovations. Although the R&D figures measure inputs into the inventive process not the output 
of commercially viable innovations and Mensch’s (1979) series is subjective, the results reveal a 
rough correspondence in trend between the measures. On the basis of these, it seems safe to 
conclude that new technology titles drawn from the MARC records of the LOC do offer reliable 
indicators of innovative activity in the U.S. in the first half of the twentieth century.
12  And, of 
course, they have advantages that the other measures lack.  The next step is to determine the 
extent to which productivity improvements and growth in per capita GNP during this period 
were driven by innovative activity during this period.   
 
III. Technological Change, Productivity, and GNP 
 
III.A. The Data  
 
  In our analysis we use annual data for the time period 1909-1949 drawn for the most part 
from four sources: the LOC MARC records for our technical change indicators, and Kendrick 
(1961), the National Industrial Conference Board’s Economic Almanac (various years), and 
Goldsmith (1956) for input and output statistics.  Aside from the MARC records, these are the 
standard sources for data on inputs and output during the period.  To be more precise, our real 
GNP series for the private non-farm economy in 1939 dollars, taken from the Economic 
Almanac, various years, are based on series computed by Kendrick.
13 Following Solow (1957), 
                                                 
12 Since none of these measures match the pattern traced by patent applications reported by the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office, especially in the 1930s, we would argue, following Schmookler (1961) and Griliches (1993), that 
the problem lies with the latter not the former. 
13To determine if our results are sensitive to the choice of the base year, we repeated the exercise using real GNP 
series expressed in 1929, 1939 and 1947 dollars and performed a similar operation for TFP.  We report our findings 
in a working version of the paper (Alexopoulos and Cohen 2008).  The results using the data in constant 1947 
dollars are virtually identical to the ones presented here, and, while there are some differences when we use the 1929 
constant dollar data, these are most likely attributable to shortcomings (noted by Kendrick) associated with the 1929 
price deflators.   Furthermore, we again obtain very similar results if we use Kendrick’s data for 1909-28 spliced 
with the official BEA series for the period 1929-49. 
  13we obtain our labor input measure from the Economic Almanac and our estimate of the capital 
stock from Goldsmith (1956). Since these capital stock estimates are only available in 1929 
dollars, when we calculate our TFP series, we convert these numbers to 1939 prices using the 
GNP deflators. Finally, in order to compute our TFP series, we employ Solow’s (1957) figure for 
the share of property in income which he, in turn, bases on data in the Economic Almanac and 
Burkhead (1953).   
 
III.B. GNP and technology 
 
We begin by estimating a bi-variate VAR to examine the links between technological 
change (as measured by our indicators) and non-farm private sector GNP per capita.  Our results 
will permit us to identify two important relationships, the impact first of technical change, as 
measured by our indicators, on GNP and, second, the relationship, if any, between the level of 
economic activity on the number of technology titles.  
 To determine if the series have unit roots we ran the standard KPSS, Dickey-Fuller and 
ERS tests.  The tests suggest that our indicators are stationary around a linear time trend. 
However, similar to the findings of Christiano and Eichenbaum (1990), the KPSS test for the 
ln(TFP) and ln(GNP per capita) series could not reject the null hypothesis that the series were 
stationary around trend, while the Dickey-Fuller and ERS tests could not reject the hypothesis 
that they have unit roots. Given these ambiguous results, we opt to use levels instead of first 
differences and include a time trend.  Specifically, we estimate the following bi-variate VAR: 
Yt = α+γt+ρYt-1 +εt                                               (1)  
for the case using the total technology, automobiles, mechanical/manufacturing, electrical 
machinery and electronics, and telecommunications measures, and 
                                Yt = α+γt+ρ1Yt-1 +ρ2Yt-2 +εt                                 (2)  
for the case where the chemical technologies and patent measures are used . In the equations , α 
is a constant, εt is a vector of time t residuals, ρi=[ ρi1 ρi2], Yt = [ln(GNPt/POPt), ln(Xt)] ′, where 
GNPt is real GNP in year t measured in 1939 dollars, POPt is the population at time t, and Xt is 
one of our technology indicators.
  As in Shea (1998) and Alexopoulos (2006), we identify 
  14technology shocks by assuming that they only affect GNP per capita with a lag.
14 Moreover, we 
include an additional lag for both patents and chemicals, because we anticipate longer lags for 
these variables than for our other indicators. There are well known delays associated with 
patents, and chemicals innovations are, for the most part, intermediate goods.  In Figure 3 and 
Table 1, we report the response of GNP per capita to various technology aggregates including: 
all technology, automobiles, chemicals, mechanical/manufacturing, electrical machinery and 
electronics, and telecommunications. 
Before we turn to our results it is useful to state clearly what we define as “technology” 
and “non-technology” shocks.  We define a “technology shock” at date t as any unanticipated 
disturbance which alters the flow of new technology titles at that date but does not 
contemporaneously affect output (or TFP).  “Non-technology” shocks at date t, on the other 
hand, include any shock that contemporaneously affects output (or TFP), such as monetary 
and/or fiscal policy shocks, uncertainty shocks as well as more broadly defined “technology 
shocks” which may include, among other things, shocks to work rules, organizational capital or 
regulations.
 15 In our framework, since technology growth (and the publication of new titles) is 
positive or zero, a negative technology shock is a shock that causes the rate of technological 
innovation to fall below the average. 
Panels A and B of Figure 3 displays the impulse responses of GNP per capita to a 
technology shock for each of the indicators along with 90 percent confidence intervals computed 
using the Monte Carlo method. Three main findings emerge. First, as shown in Panel A, GNP 
per capita rises in response to a technology shock identified by our measure but decreases in 
reaction to a technology shock identified by the patent series. This counterintuitive outcome of a 
patent-identified shock provides further confirmation that patents are poor indicators of technical 
change during this period. Second, Panels A and B show that GNP per capita rises in response to 
our positive technology shock with the peak response occurring after 2-4 years. They also 
                                                 
14 To determine if the ordering of the variables in our VARs matters, we reran the regressions with the technology 
indicator entering before ln(GNP/POP) and found that our results were, on the whole, unaffected.  We do not report 
these findings in the paper but are happy to make them available upon request.  
15 To see if our results are affected by including the war years, we also estimated a set of VARs that included real 
per capita military spending and a set that included dummy variables for the war years. Our findings are virtually 
unaltered by these modifications. 
  15indicate (as we would expect) that some shocks have a more powerful effect on GNP per capita 
than others.  Thus, technological change in manufacturing, automobiles, and 
electronics/electrical machinery appears to have had a significant impact on GNP per capita 
while shocks associated with chemical technologies do not.      
These results are confirmed by point estimates, Granger-causality tests, and the variance 
decompositions reported in the first columns of Tables 1-3.  As is revealed by the point estimates 
in Table 1, technical change in chemicals and telecommunications have little success in 
explaining movements in GNP per capita while innovations in manufacturing, electrical, and 
automobiles technologies have a strong and significant impact on output; in fact, the last three 
are significant at the five percent level.    
The variance decompositions reported in Table 3 provide further information on the role 
technological change played in determining the variance of GNP per capita.  They suggest that 
about 14 percent of the short-run variation is attributable to electronics and electrical technology, 
12.5 percent to automobiles, and 9 percent to manufacturing technologies.
16  Moreover, these 
effects increase significantly over the medium to long term, an indication that the shocks in all 
likelihood had long-lasting consequences for output. 
Our results raise an obvious question.  Does the increase in new technology titles 
represent nothing more than a serendipitous upswing in all publications in tandem with increases 
in GNP per capita or do they instead capture a causal link between technological change and 
output growth?   To help us answer this question, we replaced new technology books in the 
regressions and re-ran them using three groups of titles, children’s books, medical publications, 
and books in fiction, poetry and music, that should be unrelated to cyclical fluctuations in output.  
The coefficients on these series in the GNP per capita equation are reported at the bottom of 
Table 1. On the basis of the standard errors and the Granger-causality tests we reject the 
hypothesis that these other titles predict GNP per capita. This result is further confirmed by the 
impulse responses shown in Panel C of Figure 1. Shocks to these other series fail to have a 
significant impact on output. Overall, then, it is safe to conclude that while new technology titles 
do seem to affect economic activity, these other types of books do not.  Although not foolproof, 
the finding is, at the very least, reassuring. 
                                                 
16 See Jovanovic and Rousseau (2005) for a discussion of how electrification affected the U.S. economy during this 
time period. 
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III.C. TFP and technological change 
 
Our next task is to examine the impact of technical change on TFP.
17  Before we do this, 
it is necessary to say a few words about the TFP statistics.  There are two widely employed ways 
to compute TFP for the early part of the twentieth century, that of Kendrick (1961), based on a 
linear production function with the weights on inputs determined by their prices in a given base 
year, and that of Solow (1957), based on the more general function Q=F(K,L) where the weights 
assigned to inputs are based on factor shares.
18  We use the latter in this paper for two reasons.  
First as Domar (1962), among others, has pointed out, over long horizons the Solow (1957) 
method is likely to prove the more reliable of the two.  Second, the Tornqvist/Solow approach is 
now the method of choice for those interested in measuring changes in productivity over time 
and across sectors.   
We also present two sets of findings for TFP. The first is based on TFP unadjusted for 
capital utilization, the second adjusted using Solow’s (1957) assumption that utilization rates 
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where GNP in the equations represents private non-farm output, L the number of hours worked, 
K the capital stock, ωK is Solow’s (1957) share of property in income and u the unemployment 
rate. 
                                                 
17 We also ran regressions using output per man-hour as the relevant productivity measure.  While there are some 
differences in magnitudes, the results are broadly similar to those for TFP and therefore are not reported here.   
18 For example, Cole and Ohanian (1999) and Ohanian (2001) report Kendrick’s (1961) productivity numbers, while 
Field (2003) reports both Solow’s (1957) and Kendrick’s (1961) measures. 
  17In both cases, we estimate bi-variate VARs, this time to uncover the relationship between 
productivity and technological change. Again, we use Yt = [ln(TFPt), ln(Xt)] ′, for total 
technology, automobiles, mechanical/manufacturing, electrical machinery and electronics, and 
telecommunications: 
 Yt = α+γt+ρYt-1 +εt                                                (5)  
and  
                                         Yt = α+γt+ρ1Yt-1 +ρ2Yt-2 +εt                                           (6) 
for chemical technologies and patents. We again assume that technology shocks only affect TFP 
with a lag.  The estimated coefficients for the TFP regressions are reported in Columns 3-6 of 
Table 1 with the Granger-causality tests and the variance decompositions for the regressions 
reported in Tables 2 and 3 respectively. 
We begin with the point estimates reported in Table 1.  They indicate, much as they did 
for private non-farm GNP per capita, that increases in technological change raise productivity.
19  
The impact, once again, varies across technologies. However, correction for capital utilization, it 
turns out, has little impact on our basic results.  
In Table 2, we report the Granger causality tests for the TFP measures. As can be seen, 
TFP has a significant relationship at the five and ten percent levels with technical change across 
all subgroups save telecommunications.
 20 Finally, Table 3 contains the variance decompositions 
based on the TFP VARs.  The numbers indicate that the percent of variation in TFP explained by 
new technology grows over time.  It is much greater in year nine than in year three and the effect 
is substantial for all sub-sectors, again with the exception of telecommunications.  The major 
player is manufacturing which accounts for roughly 16-29 percent of the variation in TFP by 
year three and between 29 and 41 percent by year nine.  Automotive, electrical, and chemical 
technologies while less powerful are still non-trivial – by year three, between 8.8 and 14 percent 
of the variation in total TFP is explained by these three indicators with their effect growing to 
between 15 and 25 percent by year nine. 
The impulse responses for both adjusted and unadjusted TFP are reported in Figure 4, 
along with 90 percent Monte Carlo confidence intervals. In many respects they echo the GNP per 
                                                 
19 Coefficients that are negative are insignificantly different from zero at conventional levels of significance.  
20 The failure of telecommunications to predict changes in TFP may due to the relatively short time series and to the 
fact that many innovations in this area, like television, were still in their infancy.   
  18capita responses depicted in Figure 3. In particular, a positive total technology shock 
significantly increases productivity for approximately 7 years with the peak response occurring 
1-2 years after the shock.  Moreover, we observe similar responses of TFP (both unadjusted and 
adjusted) to sub-group specific technology shocks – chemical, automotive, electrical, 
telecommunications and manufacturing – where, with the exception of telecommunications, we 
find that TFP goes up significantly for 5-8 years following the shock. 
 
IV. Technological Change and the Great Depression. 
 
  We now turn to the 1930s and employ our indicators to address three questions related to 
technological change and the Great Depression:  were the 1930s, as Field maintains, 
technologically progressive; did negative technology shocks contribute to the sharp drop in 
economic activity in the early years of the decade; and, did positive technology shocks aid in 
economic recovery after 1934?     
 
  IV.1. Believe it or not!! The 1930s was a technologically progressive decade 
 
  As the graphs in Figure 1 illustrate, our new indicators support the claim that the period 
1929-41 was technologically more progressive than either 1909-29 or 1941-49.  The value of this 
partial corroboration of Field should not be underestimated.  He makes his case, for the most 
part, on the basis of Kendrick’s productivity numbers, rearranged to capture peak to peak 
changes in TFP.  However, as we noted in the introduction, since changes in TFP during the 
period may have been caused by factors other than technology – for example, attrition of the 
least efficient firms or retention of the most efficient workers - the former provides at best a very 
rough guide to variations in the latter.
21  In contrast, our indicators measure technological change 
directly and thus provide a precise estimate of both the path of innovative activity and its impact 
on output and productivity.   
  Quantification permits us to shed light on a subsidiary issue.    Since technological 
change during the period was not evenly distributed across sectors, the obvious question is which 
                                                 
21 In support of the attrition argument see Bresnahan and Raff (1991) and Goldin (2000) for evidence on selective 
retention of workers.  Field (2003, p. 1409-10) rejects both of these arguments. 
  19of the changes had the greatest impact on output and productivity?   As our regression results 
show, new technologies in manufacturing, electrical machinery and electronics, automobiles, 
and, to a lesser extent, chemicals mattered most while those in telecommunications were least 
significant. The implication of these findings is worth emphasizing.  If we want to identify the 
impact of new technologies on economic activity, as Cyert and Mowery (1987, p.94) point out, it 
is necessary to take a broad analytical perspective. Although case studies do help us identify 
innovations and, perhaps, their potential contribution to output and productivity, they cannot on 
their own offer a measure of their overall impact because they are generally unable to 
incorporate effects beyond the confines of a single firm or sector. For example, although 
Mensch’s (1979) list of major innovations in telecommunications and chemicals in the 1930s is 
long, suggesting that they played a major role in productivity gains during the period, our results 
indicate, instead, that their impact was relatively modest.  In short, the ability to identify 
economy wide effects depends crucially on having a quantifiable measure of technical change – 
thus the value of our new indicators.   
 
  IV.2. Technology or Not Technology…That is the question 
 
  Since the two remaining questions deal with the impact of fluctuations in innovative 
activity on the downturn and recovery during the 1930s – essentially two sides of the same coin 
– we use a single framework to respond to both.  In terms of the literature, Francis and Ramey 
(2004) and Cole and Ohanian (1999) argue that negative technology shocks in the early 1930s 
may have been a major contributor to the economic downturn while Mensch (1979) and 
Kleinknecht (1981), among others, maintain that an upsurge in innovations in the latter part of 
the decade played a key role in the country’s economic recovery.   Our new measures indicate a 
pattern of ups and downs in technological change over the decade (see Figures 1 and 2) that is 
compatible with the arguments of both groups.  Moreover, our regression results suggest that the 
economy was hit by a series of negative technology shocks between 1929 and 1935, and a series 
of positive ones from 1936 to 1941 (See Figure 5).  In short, then, prima facie evidence lends 
support to both sets of arguments.   However, this leaves unanswered the key question: did these 
fluctuations in technological change during the 1930s affect the performance of the economy?  
  20To answer this question, we use counterfactual analysis to show what the economy would have 
looked like had technology not progressed as it did during the decade.   
To begin, we pose another question: what would have happened to TFP and GNP per 
capita in the period 1929-41 had there been less innovative activity?  In a nutshell, we find that 
without innovations, TFP improvements would have been much more modest and GNP per 
capita in 1941 would have been substantially below the level actually achieved.  This is 
illustrated by the Panel A in Figure 6. Here we display the paths that GNP per capita and TFP 
would have taken had technological progress in the economy continued in the 1930s at: (1) the 
average rate that was achieved in the 1920s, and (2) the 1929 rate that was greater than the 
decadal average. (It is worth noting that 1916 and 1922 were the only years prior to the 
depression that achieved higher levels of technical change than 1929.)  Quantitatively, we 
assume that from 1930 onwards, GNP per capita and TFP are determined by the following 
relationships: 
 
ln(GNPt /Popt)=-0.0435+0.0006*t+0.8651*ln(GNPt-1 /Pop t-1)+ 0.1439*ln(Tech 1920s)   (3)  
                           (0.6298)   (0.0017)     (0.0747)                                         (0.0794) 
 
ln(GNPt /Popt)=-0.0435+0.0006*t+0.8651*ln(GNPt-1 /Pop t-1)+ 0.1439*ln(Tech 1929)    (4)  




ln(TFPt)= -0.4690+ 0.0009*t+ 0.8337* ln(TFPt-1)+ 0.0774*ln(Tech 1920s)                       (5)  
      (0.2224)    (0.0011)        (0.0849)                         (0.0365) 
 
ln(TFPt)= -0.4690+0.0009*t+ 0.8337* ln(TFP t-1)+ 0.0774*ln(Tech 1929)                        (6)  
      (0.2224)    (0.0011)        (0.0849)                         (0.0365) 
 
where GNP1929 /Pop 1929 and TFP1929 are the values observed in the data, and the numbers in 
parenthesis are the standard errors of the estimates. The figures suggest that had technological 
innovation held steady over the 1930s, and had there been no shocks hitting the economy, we 
would not have had the dramatic downturn in economic activity in the early 1930s and by 1941 
real GNP per capita would have been 16% - 26% lower (depending on the growth rate assumed) 
than the actual 1941 value and TFP would have been 8.5% – 13.5% lower.    
Panel B of Figure 6 shows what paths these variables would have taken if only the ‘non-
technology’ shocks (depicted in the first two Panels in Figure 5) had hit the economy and 
  21technical change had remained at either the average rate of the 1920s or the 1929 rate.
 Although, 
as the results in Figure 5 illustrate, both technology and ‘non-technology’ shocks are negative in 
the early 1930s, non-technology shocks seem to have played the lead role in the onset of the 
Great Depression. The paths in the counterfactual economy with constant rates of technical 
progress and non-technology shocks shown in Panel B mimic well those seen in the actual 
economy in the early 1930s.
22  The obvious conclusion is that the type of technology shocks 
identified by our indicators was at most a minor contributor to downturn in the early 1930s.  
These results, of course, do not exclude the possibility that more broadly defined technology 
shocks played a significant role in the downturn but they do indicate that pure technology shocks 
(as measured by our indicators) were relatively unimportant.
 23   As a consequence, the sharp 
drop in TFP in the period 1929-34 cannot be attributed to a decline in innovative activity but, 
instead, must have its source in some other component of the residual.     
While pure technical change seems to have played little role in the onset of the 
depression, we do find that technical change made a significant contribution to recovery - 
without the realized rates of innovation from 1936 onwards, by 1941 the economy would still 
have had much lower levels of both GNP per capita and TFP.  Panels C and D of Figure 6 
confirm the importance of technological change in achieving the 1941 levels of real GNP per 
capita and TFP.  In panel C we report the paths the variables would have taken had: (1) the 
economy not been hit by shocks from 1929 onwards, and (2) technology evolved according to 
                                                 
22 Given that the results in Sims (1980) and Burbidge and Harrison (1985) suggest only a part of the downturn can 
be explained by monetary policy shocks, these negative non-technology shocks may represent the liquidity shocks 
proposed by Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2003), the sunspot shocks identified by Harrison and Weder (2006) 
and/or  the type of uncertainty shocks discussed by Bloom (2007), Greasely  and Madsen (2006), Greasely, Madsen 
and Oxley (2001), Leahy and Whited (1996) and Romer (1990).  
23 For example, the type of “news shocks” (interpreted as news about future technical progress) introduced by 
Beaudry and Portier (2006), and examined by Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006) are not excluded as a contributor by our 
findings. Since the “news shocks” are highly correlated with the broadly defined technology shocks identified using 
Gali’s (1999) method, we assessed the sensitivity of our results by re-estimating our VARs with Beaudry and 
Portier’s (2006) measure included (which is defined by the change in the log of the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index 
divided by the population and the GNP deflator).  We found that news shocks did contribute to economic 
fluctuations during this period. However, the explanatory power of our indicators did not decrease nor did our basic 
findings change. 
   
  22the equations estimated in section three.  In other words, we now allow technical progress to 
deviate from the 1920s average or 1929 rate and assume that real GNP per capita and TFP after 
1929 evolved according to the following estimated equations: 
 
ln(GNPt /Popt)= -0.0435+ 0.0006*t+ 0.8651* ln(GNPt-1 /Pop t-1)+ 0.1439*ln(Tech t-1)     (7) 
                            (0.6298)    (0.0017)       (0.0747)                                         (0.0794) 
 
where ln(Techt)= 3.5388+ 0.0073*t+ (-0.0617)*ln(GNPt-1 /Pop t-1)+ 0.4877*ln(Tech t-1)  (8)  




ln(TFPt)= -0.4690+ 0.0009*t+ 0.8337* ln(TFPt-1)+ 0.0774*ln(Tech t-1)                       (9)  
                     (0.2224)    (0.0011)        (0.0849)                         (0.0365)  
 
where ln(Techt)= 3.1613+ 0.0091*t+ (-0.2514)* ln(TFP t-1)+ 0.4857*ln(Tech t-1)           (10)  
                   (0.8504)    (0.0043)        (0.3246)                               (0.1394) 
 
The results demonstrate the importance of increased innovative activity in the 1930s. Unlike the 
paths depicted in Panels A and B, the values of GNP per capita and TFP in this counterfactual 
economy are only about 5 and 1.6 percent below the actual values in 1941. However, as Panel D 
illustrates, once the impact of the technology shocks depicted in Figure 5 are added to equations 
(8) and (10) above, the counterfactual economy does achieve the 1941 values although the path 
taken by the counterfactual economy differs significantly from that of the actual economy. That 
is, in our counterfactual economy, the negative technology shocks of the early 1930s would have 
caused output and TFP growth to stagnate between 1931 and 1936 while the positive technology 
shocks after that date would have fostered GNP per capita growth of over 17% between 1936 
and 1941.    
Figure 7 repeats the counterfactuals for the recovery period, 1933-41. Based on the 
results in Panel A, we find that if technical change had only occurred at the 1920s average rate 
after 1933, a rate virtually identical to that in 1933, TFP levels would have been ten percent 
lower in 1939 than they actually were and GNP per capita eighteen percent lower. In fact, had 
the rate of technological change remained at the average of the 1920s even after 1939, the 
country would have had to wait until 1952 to reach 1939 levels of GNP per capita and until the 
late 1950s to match 1939 TFP.  The outcome is similar even when the 1929 rate of technological 
progress is used. In this case, we find that it would have taken until 1945 for the economy to 
  23have reached 1939 levels of GNP per capita and TFP.  The figures in Panel B indicate that 
positive non-technology shocks played an important role in determining the speed of the 
recovery from 1933 to 1936. They also reveal, however, that had the rate of technological change 
fallen below that actually achieved in the later half of the 1930s, GNP per capita in 1941 would 
have lagged the actual level by 16.8 to 25.5 percent, and TFP by 8.6 to12.8 percent.  
Panels C and D of Figure 7 again highlight the importance of stepped up technological 
progress for the economy’s recovery. Although these figures suggest that the ‘non-technology’ 
shocks did contribute to the speed of the recovery during the period 1933-38, they also confirm 
that without the major increases in technological change that occurred in the late 1930s, the 
economy would have taken a much longer time to recoup the losses caused by the Great 
Depression. As Field (2006) observes, Schumpeter (1950) was on to something - the accelerated 
pace of technological change after 1933 did wonders for economic recovery.  
In summary, we find that while the technological change identified by our indicators does 
help explain the recovery path of the US economy from the Great Depression, it provides a much 
less compelling account of the initial drop in economic activity at the beginning of the 1930s. 
Although it would be unwise to claim too much for this observation given the inherent problems 
associated with counterfactuals and the fact that our indicators only pick up a portion of what 
could broadly be defined as technological change, our results are, nevertheless, suggestive.  
Since the slowdown in innovative activity as measured by our indicators began, for the most 
part, after 1930, it would appear unlikely that the onset of the Great Depression can be ascribed 




We present in this paper a novel and we believe compelling way to measure 
technological change based on annual fluctuations in the number of new technology titles (both 
aggregate and by sub-groups) in the Library of Congress.  We argue that our indicators dominate 
the standard measures of technical change such as patent applications, research and development 
expenditures, and direct enumeration of major innovations during the years 1909-49 for a 
number of reasons.  They provide a consistent series available on an annual basis, they are based 
on strictly objective criteria – appearance in the data base of the LOC – and, perhaps most 
  24important, new technology publications are likely to track closely the timing of the 
commercialization of innovations.  We use bi-variate VAR regressions to show that causal links 
did, in fact, exist for our period between innovative activity as captured by our indicators (an 
important caveat) and GNP per capita and TFP – although, as we point out, some technologies 
mattered more than others.  In particular, manufacturing, automobile, and machine technologies 
had a much greater impact on output and productivity than those in chemicals and 
telecommunications.   
Field’s provocative claim (2003) that the 1930s was the most technologically progressive 
of the twentieth century gains at least some support from our results – the 1930s, we find, were 
much more technologically innovative than the periods 1909-1929 and 1941-49. In the final 
section of the paper we demonstrate how our new indicators can help use better understand the 
relationship between technology and economic activity in the 1930s.  Specifically, we employ a 
counterfactual analysis to isolate the contribution of technological change to both the start of and 
recovery from the depression.   As we report, the slowdown in technological change measured 
by our indicators in the early 1930s does not appear to account for much of the drop in output 
during this period. Instead we find that non-technology shocks are the primary culprit. However, 
we do find that the positive technology shocks we identify and the trend increase in 
technological change after 1933, as Field (2003, 2006) and others maintain, did play a major role 
in the economic recovery. Given that negative pure technology shocks do not appear to have 
been a major contributor to the downturn in the early 1930s, and the type of monetary policy 
shocks identified by Sims (1980) and Burbidge and Harrison (1985) only explain part of the 
downturn, future research should reexamine other possible contributors. These would included 
the liquidity shocks proposed by Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2003), the sunspot shocks 
identified by Harrison and Weder (2006) and the type of uncertainty shocks discussed by Bloom 
(2007), Greasley and Madsen (2006), and Romer (1990).    
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Appendix A. Library of Congress Classification Overview 
Subclass T Technology (General) 
Subclass TA Engineering (General). Civil engineering 
Subclass TC Hydraulic engineering. Ocean engineering 
Subclass TD Environmental technology. Sanitary engineering 
Subclass TE Highway engineering. Roads and pavements 
Subclass TF Railroad engineering and operation 
Subclass TG Bridge engineering 
Subclass TH Building construction 
Subclass TJ Mechanical engineering and machinery 
Subclass TK Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering 
Subclass TL Motor vehicles. Aeronautics. Astronautics 
Subclass TN Mining engineering. Metallurgy 
Subclass TP Chemical technology 
Subclass TR Photography 
Subclass TS Manufactures 
Subclass TT Handicrafts. Arts and crafts 
Subclass TX Home economics 
  30Appendix B. A Comparison of Dates and Examples of Publications 
Below we provide invention and innovation dates for a number of major new 
breakthroughs identified by Mensch (1979), along with dates of commercialization, the 
copyright dates of the first books available from the Library of Congress, and examples of 
different types of publications that appeared in the first three years after the commercialization of 
the new technology. In light of the inherent subjectivity of Mensch’s (1979) exercise, in a few 
instances we modified his dating on the basis of a reconsideration of the case studies in Jewkes et 
al (1969), with corroboration, where possible, from other sources. Moreover, for those cases in 
which commercialization dates were unavailable in Jewkes, et al (1969), we base our dates on 
information from http://inventors.about.com. 
  The thumbnail sketches presented below were chosen because they provide good 
examples of the range and nature of publications that one finds in the LOC data base for the 
different technologies. They include both foreign and domestic titles released by corporations, 
publishing houses, and government organizations.  
Insulin 
Date of Invention: 1889, Date of Innovation: 1922, Date of Commercialization: 1922, 
First Copyright date: 1922 
Examples of Titles:  
1)  The effects of insulin on experimental hyperglycemia in rabbits, by F. G. Banting, C. H. 
Best, J. B. Collip, J., J. R. Macleod, and E. C. Noble. Reprinted from the American 
journal of physiology, vol. 62, no. 3, November, 1922. 
  312)  A primer for diabetic patients; a brief outline of diabetic treatment, including directions 
for the use of insulin, sample menus, recipes, and food tables, by Russell M. Wilder, 
Mary A. Foley, and Daisy Ellithorpe, 1923. 
3)  The biological standardisation of insulin, Publshed/Created by League of Nations, Health 
Organization. 1925. 
Neoprene/Duprene 
Date of Invention: 1906, Date of Innovation: 1932, Date of Commercialization: 1932 for 
Duprene and 1937 for Neoprene 
First Copyright date: 1937 
Examples of Titles: 
1)  The story of neoprene (formerly sold under the trademark "DuPrene") Its discovery, 
commercial development, and significance to science and industry. A Du Pont news    
bulletin, 1937 
2)  The Neoprene notebook, Published monthly by Rubber Chemicals Division of E.I. Du 
Pont de Nemours & Co., 1938- (after 1956 the monthly publication is re-titled the 
Elastomers notebook and is still published today)  
Nylon 
Date of Invention: 1927, Date of Innovation: 1938, Date of Commercialization: Dec. 1939 
First Copyright date: 1939 (in Japanese), 1940 (in English) 
Examples of Titles:  
1)  Nylon, Published/Created by Ōsaka-fu Senpoku-gun Takaishi-machi : Bōshoku 
Zasshisha, Shōwa in Japan, 1939 
  322)  Women's full-fashioned hosiery, nylon and silk. Published/Created by Indianpolis, Ind., 
National youth administration for Indiana, 1940 
3)  Electrophoretic studies of nylon, Published/Created by Washington, U. S. Govt. print. 
off., 1941 
Penicillin 
Date of Invention: 1922, Date of Innovation: 1941, Date of Commercialization: 1943, 
First Copyright date: 1943 
Examples of Titles: 
1)  Penicillin and other antibiotics produced by microörganisms; an annotated bibliography. 
Published/Created by E. R. Squibb & sons, 1943. 
2)  Penicillin Merck, its action and uses. Published/Created by Merck & co., inc. 1943. 
3)  Abstracts on penicillin and other antibiotic substances, by Muriel E. Whalley, Research 
plans and publications section. Published/Created by the National Research Council 
Canada Ottawa, 1943. 
4)  Penicillin, by Sir Howard Florey. Published/Created by Nelson, R.W. Stiles & co., ltd., 
1944. 
5)  Penicillin. Published/Created by United States. Office of War Information. 1944 
Streptomycin 
Date of Invention: 1921, Date of Innovation: 1944, Date of Commercialization: 1945, 
First Copyright date: 1945 
Examples of Titles: 
1)  The chemotherapeutic action of streptomycin and promin in experimental tuberculosis. 
Published/Created by U. S. Govt. print. off., 1945. 
  332)  Miracles from microbes, the road to streptomycin by Samuel Epstein and Beryl Williams. 
Published/Created by Rutgers University Press, 1946. 
3)  The clinical use of streptomycin. Published/Created by Merck & Co. 1947. 
Kodachrome Film 
Date of Invention: 1910, Date of Innovation: 1935, Date of Commercialization: 1935/6, 
First Copyright date: 1937 
Examples of Titles: 
1)  Natural color film; what it is and how to use it; a work devoted to the technique and 
handling of "Kodachrome" in motion picture and still photography. By Clifford A. 
Nelson; Published/Created by The Galleon press, 1937. 
2)  How to make good color prints from Kodachrome; a manual of instruction for users of 
Curtis color printer 4 x 5, model K, 2d ed. Published/Created by Thomas S. Curtis 
laboratories, 1940. 
Silicones 
Date of Invention: 1904, Date of Innovation: 1946, Date of Commercialization: 1946, 
First Copyright date: 1946 
Examples of Titles: 
1)  An introduction to the chemistry of the silicones, by Eugene G. Rochow. 
Published/Created by J. Wiley & sons, inc., 1946. 
2)  Des caoutchoucs synthétiques aux silicones by Maurice de Buccar. Published/Created by 
Elzévir (Paris), 1946. 
  34Terylene Polyester fiber (marketed under the name Dacron by Dupont) 
Date of Invention: 1941, Date of Innovation: 1955, Date of Commercialization: 1953, 
First Copyright date: 1953 
Examples of Titles: 
1)  Home methods of spot and stain removal from most fabrics, including rayon, nylon, 
orlon, dacron, etc. Published/Created by MacKay and Associates, inc.,1953.  
2)  The dyeing of Terylene polyester fibre, second ed. Published/Created by Imperial 
Chemical Industries, ltd. Dyestuffs Division, 1954. 
Automatic Transmission 
Date of Invention: 1904, Date of Innovation: 1939, Date of Commercialization: 1939, 
First Copyright date: 1939 
Examples of Titles: 
1)  Automatic overdrive and remote-control gear shifts, by Charles Ray Strouse. 
Published/Created by International correspondence schools, 1939. 
2)  Automobile friction clutches, prepared especially for home study ... , by Charles Ray 

































































































New Technology titles GNP 1939 Dollars (Billions)




























































































New Automobile titles GNP 1939  Dollars (Billions)






























































































Manufacturing titles GNP 1939 dollars (Billions)





























































































Chemical Technologies GNP 1939 Dollars (Billions)





























































































Telecom titles GNP 1939 Dollars (Billions)
New titles on telephone, telegraph





























































































Electrical titles GNP 1939 Dollars (Billions)































































































Medicine Titles Children's titles GNP 1939 Dollars (Billions)






























































































Fiction, Music & P oetry Titles GNP 1939 Dollar s (Billions)
Fiction, Music and Poetry New Titles
 
Notes: All technology series, as well as the new children’s, medical, fiction, music and poetry titles are 
derived from the Library of Congress’ MARC record database, while the GNP series is from the 
Economic Almanac (1953-54) 
 













































































































































































Gnp 1939 Dollars (Billions) R&D spending in Industry










































































































Gnp 1939 Dollars (Billions) Major New Innovations


































































































































































































New Technology titles GNP 1939 Dollars (Billions)
All new technology titles
 
Notes: The technology indicator is based on the Library of Congress’ MARC record database, the 
GNP series is from the Economic Almanac (1953-54), the R&D personel series is from Mowery and 
Rosenberg (2000), the Major innovation count is derived from data in Mensch (1979), Industrial 
R&D series is from the Report of the Committee on Science and the Public Welfare, National 
Science Foundation (1945) and the patent series is obtained from the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office.  
  































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3. Impulse Response of Real GNP per capita  
PANEL A: Aggregate Technology Measures 
                    Total Technology                                            Patents 
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PANEL B: Specific Technology Group Measures 
         Electrical Technology                Chemical Technology             Manufacturing Technology 
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PANEL C: Other Publication Measures 
 Children’s books                       Medical Books                   Fiction, Poetry & Music 
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Notes: These VAR Cholesky orthogonalized impulse response functions are estimated using annual data from 1909-
1949. Each panel displays the response to a one-standard deviation shock to technology and the 90% confidence 































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4. Impulse Response of TFP to a Positive Technology Shock 
                                         Total Technology                                                              Electrical Technology 
                       TFP-unadjusted       TFP-adjusted             TFP-unadjusted                    TFP-adjusted  
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Traditional  telecommunications           Automotive  Technology 
        (radio, television, telephone and telegraph) 
                       TFP-unadjusted       TFP-adjusted        TFP-unadjusted       TFP-adjusted 
 










































          Years                         Years                                                                                               Years                                                                                             Years 
Notes: These VAR Cholesky orthogonalized impulse response functions are estimated using annual data from 1909-1949. Each panel displays the 
response to a one-standard deviation shock and the 90% confidence interval. In each case, ln(TFP) is the first variable in the bi-variate system.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Technology Shocks-TFP (Unadjusted) VAR
 
Notes: The shocks are obtained from the following bi-variate VARs: Yt = α+γt+ρYt-1 +εt  , where  
Yt = [ln(TFPt), ln(Techt)] ′ or Yt = [ln(GNP per capitat), ln(Techt)] ′. Based on the recursive ordering, the technology 
shock at time t is defined as the component of the technology residual which is orthogonal to the contemporaneous GDP (or 
productivity) residual.  





























































ln(Actual GNP p.c. in millions of 1939 dollars)
counterfactual using average 1920s value of new tech. titles






























































counterfactual using average 1920s value of new tech. titles
































































ln(Actual GNP p.c. in millions of 1939 dollars)
counterfactual using avg 1920s value of new
tech. titles & non-technology shocks
counterfactual using the 1929 value of new tech.































































counterfactual using avg 1920s value of new
tech. titles & non-technology shocks
counterfactual using the 1929 value of new tech.































































ln(Actual GNP p.c. in millions of 1939 dollars)




























































































































ln(Actual GNP p.c. in millions of 1939 dollars)
































































































































ln(Actual GNP p.c. in millions of 1939 dollars)
counterfactual using average 1920s value for new tech. titles






























































counterfactual using average 1920s value for new tech. titles































































ln(Actual GNP p.c. in millions of 1939 dollars)
counterfactual using avg 1920s value of new tech. titles & non-
technology shocks































































counterfactual using avg 1920s value of new tech. titles & non-
technology shocks
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  42 Table 1. Point Estimates for Real GNP per Capita and TFP regressions 
Indicator*  GNP p.c. (1939 dollars) TFP Unadjusted TFP Adjusted
   ρ11 ρ12 ρ11 ρ12 ρ11 ρ12
All  Technology  0.8651  0.1439 0.8337 0.0774 0.7239 0.0640 
  (0.0571) (0.0797)  (0.0728)  (0.0320) (0.0927) (0.0260) 
Manufacturing 0.8395  0.1025 0.7943 0.0625 0.6555 0.0591 
  (0.0596) (0.0480)  (0.0722)  (0.0203) (0.0887) (0.0170) 
Chemical**  1.3066  0.0230 1.0828 0.0493 0.8416 0.0253 
  (0.16056) 0.02863) (0.1648) (0.0214) (0.1306) (0.0273) 
 -0.4354  0.0401  -0.0268  0.0774  0.1485  0.0629 
  (0.1752) (0.0711)  (0.1592)  (0.0348) (0.1377) (0.0219) 
Electrical  0.8339  0.0894 0.8006 0.0415 0.6958 0.0275 
  (0.0489) (0.0333)  (0.0643)  (0.0180) (0.0912) (0.0134) 
Telecom  0.8872  0.0296 0.8448 0.0108 0.7280 0.0015 
  (0.0631) (0.0210)  (0.0766)  (0.0123) (0.1026) (0.0113) 
Automotive  0.9070  0.0719 0.8526 0.0281 0.7268 0.0185 
   (0.0621) (0.0359)  (0.0768)  (0.0135) (0.1048) (0.0094) 
Patents  1.2038  -0.1548 0.9552 -0.0916 0.6731 -0.0863 
  (0.1346) (0.0742)  (0.1718)  (0.0436) (0.1335) (0.0371) 
 -0.3636  0.0595  -0.1228  0.0214  0.0683  0.0231 
  (0.1216) (0.0885)  (0.1437)  (0.0504) (0.0848) (0.0343) 
0.8577  -0.0513 0.8108 -0.0335 0.6870 -0.0193  Children’s 
Books  (0.0593) (0.0618)  (0.0741)  (0.0244) (0.1031) (0.0119) 
Medical  Books 0.8901  0.0788 0.8547 0.0342 0.7535 0.0353 
  (0.0680) (0.1247)  (0.0832)  (0.0471) (0.1131) (0.0237) 
0.8808  0.0071 0.8425 -0.0003 0.7352 0.0096  Fiction, Poetry 
& Music  (0.0666) (0.0983)  (0.0788)  (0.0432) (0.1079) (0.0269) 
 Notes:  For all cases except Chemical and Patents the results correspond to the regression  
ln(GNPt /Popt)=α+γt+ρ11ln(GNPt-1/Pop t-1)+ρ12ln(Techt-1) +ε t  and ln(TFPt)=α+γt+ρ11ln(TFPt-1)+ρ12ln(Techt-1) +ε t .  
For the cases of chemicals and patents the regressions are:   
ln(GNPt /Popt)=α+γt+ ρ11ln(GNPt-1/Pop t-1)+ ρ21ln(GNPt-2/Pop t-2)+ ρ12ln(Techt-1)+ ρ22ln(Techt-2) +ε t  and 
ln(TFPt)=α+γt+ ρ11ln(TFPt-1)+ ρ21ln(TFPt-2)+ ρ12ln(Techt-1)+ ρ22ln(Techt-2) +ε t , where the first row reports the 
estimated values of ρ11and ρ12 and the second row corresponds to the estimates of ρ21and ρ22. 
  43Table 2. P-values for Granger Causality Tests 
Panel A: Does Technology Granger Cause GNP per capita? 





Unadjusted   
TFP 
Adjusted 
All Technology  1  0.071  0.016  0.014 
Manufacturing 1  0.033  0.002 0.001 
Chemical 2  0.626  0.001  0.004 
Electrical 1  0.007  0.021  0.041 
Telecom 1  0.158  0.379  0.896 
Automotive 1  0.045  0.037  0.050 
Patents 2  0.022  0.004  0.0018 
Panel B: Does GNP per capita Granger Cause Technology? 





Unadjusted   
TFP 
Adjusted 
All Technology  1  0.669  0.471  0.538 
Manufacturing 1  0.804  0.299 0.134 
Chemical 2  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Electrical 1  0.957  0.659  0.686 
Telecom 1  0.055  0.049  0.818 
Automotive 1  0.080  0.077  0.086 
Patents 2  0.114  0.211  0.211 
Panel C: Do Other Titles Granger Cause GNP per capita or TFP? 





Unadjusted   
TFP 
Adjusted 
Children   1  0.406  0.169  0.105 
Medical 1  0.527  0.468  0.136 
Fiction, Poetry & Music  1  0.942  0.994  0.722 
Panel D: Does GNP per capita or TFP Granger Cause Other Titles? 





Unadjusted   
TFP 
Adjusted 
Children   1  0.553  0.533  0.496 
Medical 1  0.475  0.436  0.445 
Fiction, Poetry & Music  1  0.532  0.674  0.860 
Notes: For the cases of total technology, automotive, manufacturing, electrical, telecommunications, 
children’s, medical and fiction, poetry and music books, Yt = α+γt+ρYt-1 +εt  , and for the case of patents 
and chemical technologies Yt = α+γt+ρ1Yt-1 +ρ2Yt-2 +εt , where Yt = [ln(TFPt), ln(Xt)] ′ or  
Yt = [ln(GNP per capitat), ln(Xt)] ′ and Xt is the value of the indicator at time t.
  44Table 3. Variance Decompositions 
 






 3  years  6.55  9.53  13.07 
All Technology  6 years  11.87  16.87  21.11 
 9  years  13.56  18.75 22.17 
        
 3  years  9.02 15.77 28.62 
Manufacturing 6  years  16.69  27.17  40.53 
 9  years  19.12  29.40 40.70 
        
 3  years  0.59 10.11 14.26 
Chemical 6  years  1.05  14.78  23.15 
 9  years  1.10 15.08 23.45 
        
 3  years  13.24  14.01 12.45 
Electrical 6  years  21.95  23.25  19.81 
 9  years  24.38  25.38 20.82 
        
 3  years  2.71 1.87  0.07 
Telecom 6  years  4.01  2.79  0.10 
 9  years  4.35 3.01  0.10 
        
 3  years  12.41 8.81  7.52 
Automotive 6  years  24.58  17.83  14.22 






















Notes: These decompositions are based on bi-variate VARs where ln(GNP per capita) and ln(TFP) are 
ordered first. For the cases of total technology, automotive, manufacturing, electrical, and 
telecommunications, the VAR takes the form Yt = α+γt+ρYt-1 +εt  , while for the case of chemical 
technologies Yt = α+γt+ρ1Yt-1 +ρ2Yt-2 +εt , where Yt = [ln(TFPt), ln(Xt)] ′ or Yt = [ln(GNP per capitat), 
ln(Xt)] ′ and Xt is the value of the indicator at time t. 
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